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Abstract 
This paper analyzes household appliance purchase and energy consumption and conser- 
vation related  to demand for lighting.  The behavioral model is estimated using  data  on 
consumers' choices between various types of electric light bulbs with large differences in 
purchase  costs,  operating  costs  and  lifetimes.  The  model  allows  the  utility  attached  to 
energy conservation per se to vary across consamers and explicitly takes into account the 
random  nature  of the  lifetimes  of lamp~.  Due  to  the  panel  nature  of the  data  and  the 
differences between lifetimes of high-efficiency and low-efficiency lamps, the consumer's 
discount rate can be estimated without assuming that he correctly perceive the operating 
costs. The estilnated annual discount rate is about  15 percent, somewhat lower than most 
estimates is earlier studies. 
JEL classification: DI2; Q20 
Keywords: Energy consumption; Individual discounting; Binary panel data 
1. Introduction 
Household demand for heating, cooling  and lighting are examples  where the 
appliances  available  on  the  market  offer  substantial  possibilities  for  tradeoffs 
between  purchase and operating costs.  The tradeoff possibilities  in the lighting 
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case  are  due  to  the recent though wide  availability of the  so-called Compact 
Fluorescent Lamp (CFL).  As compared to a conventional electric light bulb, its 
initial purchase price is about thirty times as  high, but it uses  80 percent less 
electricity and its lifetime is about eight times as long. 
In various countries programs have been initiated which should promote the use 
of lamps with high energy efficiency. Given the fact that household demand for 
lighting services accounts for about one quarter of household electricity consump- 
tion, ~ the programs might play an important role in energy conservation policies. 
Most programs  include financial incentives such  as  discounts on the purchase 
costs  of high-efficiency lamps  or  taxes  on  low-efficiency versions;  see  Mills 
(1991) for a review. 
As  emphasized by Lewis  and Sappington (1992),  knowledge of consumer's 
preferences  regarding  energy  consumption and  conservation is  crucial  for  an 
accurate welfare assessment of incentive programs. Results of some earlier stadies 
have suggested that the returns consumers require on ener~gy efficiency invest- 
ments are much higher than the capital market rate of return.  The debate initiated 
by these results suggests that the existence of information barriers, in particular 
regarding the operating costs of durables, is one important explanation. 
The present paper provides new empirical evidence on consumers' preferences 
with respect to energy-using durables using information that differs from that used 
in earlier studies in a number of respects. 
First, we analyze household demand for lighting services. In view of its share 
in total household electricity consumption and the potential for conservation, the 
lighting case has received very limited attention as compared to household demand 
for heating and cooling. From the viewpoint of economic modeling the interesting 
aspect  of  the  lighting  case  is  the  large  difference  between  the  lifetimes  of 
high-efficiency  and low-efficiency lamps. This introduces an additional element of 
discounting  in  the  consumer's  decision problem.  It  is  not  only  the  trade-off 
between  purchase  and  operating costs  that plays  a  role,  but  also  the  tradeoff 
between paying a high purchase price relatively infrequently, or paying a lower 
purchase price more frequently. 
Secondly, our data consists of ~:onsumer's hypothetical choices between differ- 
ent types of electric light bulbs, for a number of different values of purchase costs. 
The use of hypothetical survey ~ta is sometimes criticized because of a possible 
lack of incentives for participants to make accurate assessments.  On the other 
hand, there are important advantages over data on actual purchases. The first is 
that -  as we shall see from the Oescription of the survey -  both the consumer's 
i Source:  Kemna et al. (1991, appendix G). 
2 Hausman (1979)  estimated a  model of the purchase and utilization  of air-conditioners,  with an 
implied average annual  discount rate of 26.4 percent. In a  similar analysis for water-space heaters, 
Dubin and McFadden (1984) arrived at an estimate of 20.5 percent. The results have been discussed by 
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choice set and information set are defined much more precisely then would be the 
case with actual purchases data. The second advantage is that the survey allows to 
confront the consumer with a variation in prices that is much larger than the price 
variation in actual  purchase  data.  The  limited price  variation in data  on  actual 
purchases would be unlikely to allow for the estimation of the price sensitivity 
parameters with reasonable precision, j 
Finally, the panel aspect of the data allows for the incorporation of individual 
specific fixed effects in the econometric model. Combined with the difference in 
lifetimes between low-efficiency and high-efficiency versions this makes it possi- 
ble to estimate the discount rate without assuming that the respondents correctly 
perceives the operating costs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a behavioral model. In 
particular, the role of asslLmptions with respect to the time horizon of the decision 
maker, the lifetime of the durables, and other characteristics of the durables than 
costs are investiga',ed. Section 3 briefly describes the data (a more detailed data 
description is provided in Appendix A. The model is estimated using a method 
proposed  by Chamberlain (1984)  for estimating discrete  choice  models  in  the 
presence of fixed effects. The econometric details as well as the empirical results 
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Behavioral model 
The questions in our survey refer to replacing a light bulb for a particular type 
of lamp in the respondent's household. We therefore model the choice between a 
low-efficiency and a high-efficiency fight bulb conditional on a particular degree 
of  utilization.  It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  we  do  not  assume  that  the 
availability of high-efficienc  7  versions has no effect on utilization. What we do 
assume is that the respondent, when answering the questions, does not anticipate 
that he might change utilization. 
The following notation will be used: 
Ri: the purchase price of type i, i = L, H; 
T/: lifetime (utilization hours) of type i, i = L,H; 
,ri: electricity use per hour of utilization (kilowatt hours) of type i, i = L, H; 
p: respondent's perception of electricity price per kilowatt hour; 
h: hours of utilization per day. 
L  and H  refer to the low-efficiency and high-efficiency version of the durable, 
respectively. We assume x L > ~'H, RL < RH and T  L <  T  u. 
Assume that the consumer compares the discounted costs of types L and H over 
3 Within  the context of individual discounting  hypothetical  survey data have been used before by 
e.g. Fuchs (1982) and Cropper et al. (1992). 106  P. Kooreman  / Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996) 103-114 
the fixed lifetime T  H of one, type H lamp. Suppose that a type H  lamp, purchased 
at t =  0, operates  h hours per day. Then it provides its services from t =  0 until its 
failure on day t =  TH/h.  Generating the same services using type L would require 
purchasing type L lamps at t =  O, t =  TL/h,  t -- 2TL/h .....  t =  (TH/T L -  I )TL/h, 
(It is  assumed  throughout  that  TH/T L  is integer).  The operating  costs  are  paid 
continuously, but with a possible time lag of length D(> 0). Then the discounted 
operating and purchase costs of types L  and H are given by 
(rH/TL)-- l 
C~  :  "of(rH/h)+Oph~'L"  e-~'dt + RL {  k~=O e-'SkTL/h  ! 
1 -e  -~rH/h ) 
PhrL  e -~o  (l--e  -STH/h)-I-R L  ~-~TL/h  (1) 




• e -8°- (1 -  e -St./h)  +Rn,  (2) 
8 
respectively. Here 8  is the consumer's discount rate per day. 
It may also be hypothesized that the operating and purchase costs are evaluated 
over a multiple M  of T n, assuming that in case of failure a lamp is replaced by a 
new one of the same type. In that case both Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are multiplied by 
(1 -  exp(- 8MTH/h))/(1  -  exp(-8Tn/h)).  Since this does not affect the sign of 
Ct~ -  C~, the choice of M  is immaterial. We choose  M =  ~. 
The assumption of deterministic lifetime is unlikely to be a good approximation 
of reality. In fact, product infom, ation often mentions the lifetime 'on average', or 
makes some other statement in probability terms.  Assume that the lifetime t i is a 
random  variable with expectation  T/.  Then (for  M =  ~) the expected discounted 
purchase and operating costs of type i,  i =  L, H, are given by 
PhTi  --SD  ,  Ri 
k  #  Ci  6  ~  -r  1 -  E(e -8',/")  13~ 
(see Appendix B). In the sequel we shall consider the case with fixed lifetimes and 
the  case  with  random  lifetimes  and  constant  hazard  rates.  In  the  latter  case 
E(exp(-dt.))  = (1 +  dT/) -1,  so  that  C i  =  e -s°  .p'ri/d + Ri(d +  l/Ti)/d,  with 
d:=8/h. 
Since  the  high-efficiency  and  the  low-efficiency  versions  are  not  exactly 
identical in all other respects than purchase price, operating costs and lifetime, the 
choice will most likely not be based on mere cost minimization. Consumers may 
also  prefer  a  high-efficiency  lamp  per  se  because  it  is  claimed  that  they  are 
preferable from an environmental point of view. For these reasons we assume that 
the utility generated by a  lamp of type  i  is given by  U~ =  ~li -  Ci,  i =  L, H,  and P. Kooreman /  Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996) 103-114  107 
that behavior is determined by utility maximization. Then type H is chosen if and 
only if 
eL -- YL :> CH -- 'YH"  (4) 
Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (4) and rewriting yields 
P(¢L-  ~'H) "e-SD--RH  1 --Ee -dtH  "t-RL  1 --Ee --dr" 
-k(TH--  'YL)d >  0.  (5) 
Since  p  enters  linearly  in  Eq.  (5),  it  may  be  interpreted  as  the  mean  of  a 
distribution function describing the respondent's perception of various possible 
values of the electricity price. In Section 4 empirical analogues of Eq. (5) will be 
estimated. 
3. Data 
The information Lhat will be analyzed are the individual's choices out of a  set 
of 9  different electric light bulbs in cage A  (floor-lamp) and out of 13 different 
electric light bulbs in case B (hanging-lamp). In both cases two light bulbs were of 
the ~gh-efficiency type. Let the respondents be indexed by  n =  1  ..... N. In each 
case, the tth choice of respondent n  is characterized by a  price vector p,,  and a 
scalar y,,  wh/ch is 1 if a high-efficiency lamp is chosen and 0 otherwise. Thus the 
choice states have been pooled into two groups. 4 The number of choices varies 
across respondents. Appendix A provides further details on the data collection and 
explains  how  the  number  of  choices  per  respondent  is  determined.  We  also 
observe for each  respondent a  vector of individual characteristics  x..  Table  1 
summarizes the data. 
The values of h that will be used below are based on a detailed Dutch survey on 
household electricity use (Kemna et al,  1991). For case A  we use h = 0.808 and 
h =  0.891, which are the mean and the median hours, respectively, of utilization 
per day (yearly average) for floor-lamps in the representative household. For case 
B  we use the mean (h =  1.72) and the median (h =  2.28) utilization for hanging- 
lamps. 
+ To test whether this  dichotomization is  acceptable I  estimated a  multinomial logit model and 
performed a test for pooling states; see Cramer and Ridder (1991). In view of the presence of the fixed 
effects (see Section 4), the multinomial  Iogit model was estimated using only the first choice of each 
respondent.  The explanatory variables were FEMALE and dummies for AGE and SOCA. The pooling 
hypotheses were rejected at the 5% significance level but not at the 1% level. 108  P. Kooreman /  Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996) 103-114 
Table 1 
Sample characteristics 
Variable  Mean  S.d.  Min  Max 
Case A a 
No. of choices per individual  14.6  7.3  5  31 
Fraction of type H choices per individual  0.15 
Fraction of resp. who only choose type H  0.10 
Fraction of resp. who only choose type L  0.60 
Price of type H (R u)  15.60  9.61  !0.00  45.00 
Price of type L (R L)  2.48  1.15  0.90  7.44 
Case B b 
No. of choices per individual  13.3  8.1  5  37 
Fraction of type H choices per individual  0.08 
Fraction of resp. who only choose type H  0.02 
Fraction of resp. who only choose type L  0.72 
Price of type H (R n)  13.31  7.92  10.00  45.00 
Price of type L (R  L)  2.88  ! .54  0~90  9.13 
Individual characteristics 
AGE between 18 and 34  0.33 
AGE between 35 and 49  0.32 
AGE between 50 and 65  0.35 
FEMALE  0.52 
SOCAI  c  0.27 
SOCA2 c  0.20 
SOCA3 c  0.21 
SOCA4 c  0.32 
a Number of individuals:  125. 
b Number of individuals:  126. 
c Constructed on the basis of income and education (not provided separately). SOCAI corresponds to 
the lowest income and education levels, SOCA4 to the highest. 
4. Estimation 
In view of Eq. (5), the following binary choice model with fixed effects will be 
estimated: 
l 
Ynt  =  Otn q- [3H RH,nt -I- [3  L RL,nt  4;" Ent 
4y~t  =H  if  Ynt >0 
=  L  otherwise 
(6) 
with  ot n =p('r L -- a'H)- e -aD +  (~/Hn -- "YEn) d'  [~L =  d/(1 -  Eexp(-dtL))  and 
[3 n  =  -d/(l  -  Eexp(-dtH));  Ynt =  1 if respondent n chooses type H at choice t, 
and  Y,,t =  0  otherwise. The error term ~t  represents i.i.d,  optimization errors. We 
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T  a >  T  L, we should have, moreover, that IbLI > Ibal. Estimates of d are obtained 
by solving d  from  bL/b u =  -(1 -exp(-dTa))/(I  -exp(-dTL))  for the case 
t i =  T/, and from bL/b H =  -(I/T L + d)/(l/T  n + d) for the case t i ~  exp(l/T,). 
The interesting feature of this way of identifying d is that it does not use any of 
the  components  of  the  fixed  effect.  Thus  the  estimate  does  not  require  the 
respondent to have a  correct perception of the operating costs, and it allows the 
preference parameters "/u mad 3tL to vary across respondents. This is possible due 
to the panel nature of the data and to the fact that  T  L ~  T  n.  It is the trade-off 
between different combinations of present and future purchase costs that identifies 
d. Note that d would not be identified if T  L =  Ta. 
Due to the design of the experiment (see Appendix A), a strong preference of a 
respondent  for  type  H  lamps  (i.e.  a  large  value  (~'n- ~/L)) will  result  in  a 
relatively large number of observed price combinations with high values of  R a 
and  low values of  R L.  In fact,  the prices and the  number of observations per 
respondent  are  endogenous  variables  in  the  sense  that  they  depend  on  the 
respondent's previous choice. However, the appropriate likelihood function is the 
likelihood function of choices conditional on prices and number of observations, 
as shown in Appendix B. The correlation between individual effects and prices is 
reflected by the upper panel of Table 2 which shows wrong signs for price effects 
in  a  logit  specification  for  Eq.  (6)  with  fixed  effects  ignored.  Because  the 
correlation between the individual effects  at,, and prices prohibits the use of a 
random effects estimator,  we use the estimator for the fixed effects logit model 
proposed by Chamberlain 0984). The estimator exploits the fact that in the logit 
model the probability of observing a particular sequence of choices conditional on 
Y'-tY,,  is independent of  ot n.  As a  result the  13's can be  estimated consistently 
without estimating the ot's. 
Table 2 
Estimation results (t-values in paren~eses) 
Case A  Case B 




--2.17  --3.88 
( -  1 i.8)  ( -  16.5) 
-0.280  0.140 
(--4.8)  (2.6) 
0.060  0.065 
(8.7)  (8.2) 
With  fixed effects 
RL 
Rn 
0.483  0.725 
(4.5)  (4.7) 
•  -  -0.216  -0.143 
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Table 3 
Implied discount rates (asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Median utilization  Mean utilization 
Case A 
Fixed lifetimes 
Constant hazard rates 
Case B 
Fixed lifetimes 
Constant hazard rates 
0.173  0.191 
(0.045)  (0.050) 
0.172  0.189 
(0.068)  (0.075) 
0.122  0.092 
(0.055)  (o.o41) 
0.075  0.056 
(0.o40)  (0.030) 
The estimation results  for the fixed effects logit model are  displayed in the 
lower  panel  of  Table  2.  All  estimates  have  the  expected  signs  and  relative 
magnitude and are highly significant. 
The annual discount rates implied by the models in the case of fixed lifetimes 
are reported in Table 3. In accordance with the information on the packaging of 
the  light  bulbs,  we  used  T  L =  1000  and  T  n =  8000.  The  discount  rates  are 
somewhat lower than those obtained by Hausman (1979) and Dubin and McFad- 
den (1984).  The high estimates of these authors have been partly attributed to a 
possible ignorance or underestimation of the operating costs from the part of the 
consumer. The present estimates, I~owever, do not rely on the accurateness of the 
consumer's perception of the operating costs. 
If  the  consumer  anticipates  that  lifetimes  are  random,  all  discounts  rates 
become lower (although in case B the difference is much larger than in case A). In 
Kooreman (1995) it was shown that the discount rate obtained under the assump- 
tion that lifetimes are random cannot exceed the discount rate obtained under the 
assumption of fixed lifetimes, if the two versions have the same lifetime distribu- 
tion. However, the result need not hold when the lifetimes have different distribu- 
5  tions, as in the present case. 
We  have also estimated the  model with the discount rate  being allowed to 
depend on individual characteristics.  The results  suggest a  negative relationship 
between the discount rate and the respondent's social class and a higher discount 
for  women  as  compared  to  men,  but  the  coefficients  were  not  significantly 
different from zero. 
5 This  is  illustrated  by  the  following  example.  Let  R u =  1200,  R L =800,  D=0,  PXH =  1, 
pT  L ----25,  T H =  20,  and  T L =  10.  Denote the solution of  CL(d)= CH(d) by d r  when lifetimes are 
fixed, and by d s when lifetimes follow exponential distributions. Then 0.127 = d F >  d s = 0.110. But if 
T  H = 40, with the other parameters unchanged, 0.147 =  d r < d s = 0.185. P. Kooreman /  Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996) 103-114  I I 1 
Table 4 
Price elasticities 
Prices  Pr~ y =  1)  Elasticities with respect to 
RL  RH 
Case A 
R n  =  15; R L =  2.5  0.15  !.03  -2.72 
R n  =  15; R L -- 5.0  0.37  1.52  -- 2.03 
Ru =  10; R t  =  2.5  0.34  0.80  -  1.42 
R n =  10; R L =  5.0  0.64  0.88  -0.79 
Case B 
R H =  15; R L =  2.5  0.08  1.68  -  1.96 
R n  =  15; R L =  5.0  0.35  2.38  -  1.39 
R n  =  10; R L =  2.5  0.15  1.55  -  1.21 
R n  =  10; R t  =  5.0  0.52  i.73  -  0.68 
The elasticities of the probability of a  choice for type H  with respect to the 
purchase prices of bo:h types are given in Table 4. 6 The numbers show strong 
price responses at ali price levels and indicate that price changes will be effective 
as an instrument to increase the penetration of high-efficiency lamps to the desired 
level. 7 
The  present  penetration rate  of high-efficiency lamps  in  the  Netherlands is 
about 9 percent of the total number of light bulbs. 8 At the current electricity price 
and average market prices of lamps, a consumer who behaves on the basis of mere 
cost,  ,afinimization will replace approximately 9  percent of the household's light 
9 The fact  bulbs by a high-efficiency type if his discount rate is about 30 percent. 
that our estimated discount rates are lower indicates that for most consumers the 
preference parameter (TH -- TL) is negative. Thus most consumers seem to have a 
ceteris pafibus preference for the conventional types. A reason could be that most 
high-efficiency lamps  are  larger  than  their  low-efficiency counterparts.  This 
suggests that the production of high-efficiency lamps that are more similar in size 
and shape to the conventional light bulbs should be encouraged. 
6The  elasticities  were  calculated  using  l~(y =  I)=(I  +exp(-(a-t-bLR  L ÷bHRH))) -I,  with  ot 
chosen such that at average prices Pr(y =  I) equals the sample frequency of y  =  I. 
7 The objective of the Dutch EnvironraentalAction Plan is that in 1996 85 percent of all light bulbs 
should be of the high-efficiency type. 
s Author's estimate on the basis information in Kemna et al. (1991) and nation wide sales figures. 
9 This follows from solving ~  from C L =  C n  (see Eq. (3)), with  R H =  37.5,  R L =  1.5, T n  =  8000, 
T L =  1000, ~r  H =0.015,  x L =0.075,  p=  0.21,  D=O  and h =  2.78). The value for h  is the 9% upper 
quantile of the distribution of utilization hours. The solution for ~  is 36.8 percent with fixed lifetimes 
and 26.6 percent ~,,h constant hazard rates. 112  P. Kooreman /  Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996)  103-114 
5. Conclusions 
In  this paper,  an econometric  model  is estimated  which describes  consumer 
behavior with respect to appliance purchase and energy consumption for lighting. 
All estimated coefficients were in accordance  -  in sign, size and significance - 
with the theoretical model,  and imply strong responses with respect to purchase 
prices. The implied discount rates appear to be somewhat lower than the Hausman 
(1979)  estimate  within the  context  of household  demand  for  cooling  and  the 
estimate of Dubin and McFadden (1984) within the context of demand for heating. 
The  high  estimates  of  Hausman  and  Dubin  and  McFadden  have  been  partly 
attributed to a possible ignorance or underestimation of the operating costs from 
the  part  of the  consumer.  The  present  estimates  however  do  not  rely  on  the 
accurateness of the consumer's percepti~e of operating costs. 
The estimated discount rates are still somewhat higher than the capital market 
rate of return. Apart from possible specification errors with respect to functional 
form in the econometric model, an explanation might be that the consumer takes 
the expected lifetime of a high-efficiency lamp to be shorter than indicated by the 
manufacturer, for example because of the hazard of breakage. This interpretation 
is supported by the fact that the model in which consumers take the random nature 
of  lifetimes  into  account  yields  lower  estimated  discount  rates.  If  consumers 
perceive the hazard of failure to be larger than the actual failure rate, incentive 
programs might include a  warranty arrangement for the case of an early failure. 
Another explanation for a discount that exceeds the market rate of interest is the 
existence of liquidity constraints, in which case the utility companies could buy 
the appliance~ and lease them to their customers.  To  distinguish between these 
explanations,  future  surveys  should  contain  direct  questions  on  liquidity  cou- 
straints and on the consumer's perception of the actual lifetime of the durable. 
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Appendix A. Description  of the survey 
The data analyzed in this paper were collected in November  !99! by a Dutch 
marketing  agency.  At  different  locations  in  the  Dutch  Rimcity  a  number  of 
individuals were interviewed about replacing electric light bulbs.  Participants in P. Kooreman  / Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996) 103- i 14  ! 13 
the survey were between 18 and 65 years of age and had indicated that they were 
the ones in their household who usually decided on lamp replacement. 
The  participants  entered a  room  with  nine burning  light bulbs  which  were 
different with respect  to  energy use,  lifetime, purchase  price,  size,  shape  and 
possibly  character  of  illumination.  The  .r¢spondent  was  allowed  to  read  the 
information on the original packaging of the light bulbs, which incl~ded informa- 
tion on lifetime and energy use, but not on the electricity price. Next a picture of a 
floor-lamp was shown to the respondent and the following question was asked: 
"Suppose you have to replace a  light bulb for a  floor-lamp like the one on the 
picture.  Suppose that  these products  were for  sale  in  a  store  at  the prices  as 
indicated here. Which one would you buy?" After the individual had chosen one 
type, the price of the preferred type was increased. Next the individual was asked 
to choose again. The experiment continued until the highest price of a type was 
reached. For each type five different prices were prespecified. So the minimum 
number of choices observed for a respondent is five (if he sticks to the type of his 
fh'st choice) while the maximum possible number of choices is 45. 
Next,  the experiment was  repeated for the case  of a  hanging-lamp, with  a 
choice set of 13 different light bulbs. 
Appendix B. Derivations 
B.L Eq. (3) 
Let  s I < s 2 < s 3 <  ...  be the random points in time at which the durable fails 
and is replaced by a new one of the same type. Using the fact that s~,(s2 -  sl), (s3 
-  s 2)  ....  are independent drawings from the probability density function of z i/h, 
the discounted purchase and replacement costs can be written as 
E[R,(1 +e -~' + e-~  + e-~  +  ...)] 
-- E[ Ri(1  +  e-6~i  +  e-SS,  . e-~(~2-s,) 
+e-8~,. e-~(~-~,), e- ~(,,-~) +...)] 
O0 
=RiE(Ee-~t,/h)k  Ri 
k=O  =  |  --Ee-&Jh"  (B.I) 
which is the second term in Eq. (3). The first term gives the discounted operating 
COSts: 
ph~r  i 
f~  • e-  (B.2)  ph7  i • e- 8~ds =  ~  8o 114  P. Kooreman  / Resource and Energy Economics 18 (1996) 103-114 
B.2. Likelihood function 
Let  rH. !  .... ,rH,  r  be  the  prespecified  prices  for type H  and  rL, I ..... rL,  r  the 
prespecified prices for type L. We consider the case  T =  2;  the extension to the 
general case is straightforward. 
At the first choice, the prices are (RH, I, RL, t) =  (r~,~  a, rLa). The prices faced at 
the  second  choice  are  (RH,  2, RL,  2) =  (ra, 2, rLa)  if  Yl =  1  and  (RH,  2, RL.2) = 
(rH, ~, rL.  2) if y~ = 0. ThUS choices are determined by the signs of 
Yl  =  ot +/~H rH,I +  ~L rL,I +  e! 
y~  a+  ~H[ Y, rH,2 +  (1  --y,)rI~,, ]  +  ilL[ YlrL,, +  (1  -- Yl)rL,2]  +  ~2 
(B.3) 
Due to the recursive nature of Eq. (B.3) (Yl*  does not depend on  Y2), the model 
does not require any coherency conditions; cf. Heckman (1978).  Since the survey 
design  defines  a  one-one  relationship  between  choice  sequences  and  price  se- 
quences, maximization of the likelihood function of choices conditional on prices 
constitutes a full information maximum likelihood procedure. 
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